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contempt due to its inability to provide potable water to its citizens, and refusal by a state actor to provide water has rarely been prosecuted. 8 This is particularly true for the world's Least Developed Countries (LDCs), 9 which cannot afford to provide their citizens with water. Moreover, national and international courts are powerless to enforce the right against any dictator who does not wish to provide his people with potable water and good sanitation.
A. The Dilemma with the Right
There are two fundamental problems with the "right." First, it is unenforceable. 10 Indeed, it is axiomatic that there can be no right without a remedy. 11 In addition, as Joseph Vining observed, "[t]hat improvement, and the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. In its latest triennial review of the list of LDCs in 2003, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations used the following three criteria, as proposed by the Committee for Development Policy (CDP), for the identification of the LDCs:
• a low-income criterion, based on a three-year average estimate of the gross national income (GNI) per capita (under $750 for inclusion, above $900 for graduation);
• a human resource weakness criterion, involving a composite Human Assets Index (HAI) based on indicators of: (a) nutrition; (b) health; (c) education; and (d) adult literacy; and
• an economic vulnerability criterion, involving a composite Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) based on indicators of: (a) the instability of agricultural production; (b) the instability of exports of goods and services; (c) the economic importance of non-traditional activities (share of manufacturing and modern services in GDP); (d) merchandise export concentration; and (e) the handicap of economic smallness (as measured through the population in logarithm); and the percentage of population displaced by natural disasters.
Id.
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See Hardberger, supra note 8, at 563 (discussing the difficulty of enforcing water rights).
11. The Latin term for the doctrine is ubi jus ibi remedium. See generally, United States v. Pena-Gonzalez, 62 F. Supp. 2d 358, 365 (D. P.R. 1999) ("We begin with a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence, ubi jus ibi remedium-where there is a which evokes no sense of obligation is not law. It is only the appearance of law." 12 Thus, the putative right is of little help or solace to those who have no access to potable water or to the millions who die annually due to its unavailability. 13 Second, the rights scholars do not address how the issue of privatization of water utilities, especially the failure of corporate privatization and the commodification of water, should fall within the penumbra of the right. 14 These issues have yet to be addressed, leaving this area of the law unsettled and burdened by practical pitfalls.
This Article proposes a legal and pragmatic solution to the problem of potable water for the world's poor and unpacks the contours of the human right to water. The solution is based on a model of privatized access to water 15 grounded in a microfinancing paradigm that is in turn founded upon a loan program that was part of the New Deal's Rural Electrification Act of 1936 (REA). model therefore sidesteps the rights-based scheme, resting upon a more concrete foundation of measurable results (i.e., the number of the world's 2.2 billion people who lack potable water that will obtain access to water versus the number that will not).
Part II provides a background for the remedy by establishing the magnitude of the problem created by a lack of clean potable water and sanitation. As part of this discussion, the Article examines the environmental burden of waterborne disease. Part III examines multinational corporations' failed efforts at privatizing water systems in the developing world. Part IV explores substitutes to privatization by corporate entities and the World Bank, including various communities' efforts to privatize water systems that they use daily and partnerships between communities and water utilities. Part V addresses the New Deal's Rural Electric Cooperatives and assesses this model's potential use in resolving the current dearth of potable water in the developing world. Finally, Part VI outlines the microcredit system and suggests how it can be implemented to meet the goal of attaining potable water for the poor.
II. A WORLD WANTING FOR CLEAN WATER
A. The Enormity of the Problem "Safe drinking water, sanitation and good hygiene are fundamental to health, survival, growth and development." 17 Accordingly, the World Health Organization (WHO) recently observed that "[s]afe drinking water and basic sanitation are so obviously essential to health that they risk being taken for granted." 18 Unless people gain access to sources of drinking water that are clean, safe, and reliable, "[e]fforts to prevent death from diarrhea or to reduce the burden of such diseases as ascaris, dracunculiasis, hookworm, schistosomiasis and trachoma are doomed to failure." 19 The problem is so pervasive that former South African President Thabo Mbeki recently asserted that "[w]e have a duty to fight against domestic and global apartheid in terms of access to water." 20 The United Nations (UN) similarly declared that " [o] vercoming the crisis in water and sanitation is one of the great human development challenges of the early twenty-first century. [In addition, s]uccess in addressing that challenge through a concerted national and international response would act as a catalyst for progress in public health." 21 Unfortunately, the average person in the developing world will not realize the universal availability of faucets or water piping at home "in the short-or even medium term." 22 Such persons will be bereft of safe water for the foreseeable future. 23 Of course, the burdens of polluted water, lack of access to potable water, and basic sanitation deficiencies fall on the poor. 24 They are not only much "less likely to have access to safe water and sanitation, but . . . also less likely to have the financial and human resources to manage the impact of this deprivation." 25 Additionally disease, 88% are fully ascribed to unsafe water and deficient sanitation. 33 It is for these reasons that the WHO declared in 2003 that providing water to the peoples of the developing world was an urgent priority. Similarly, the UN adopted the Millennium Development Goals, 34 which seek to halve the number of people who do not have access to water by 2015. 35 Without any financial support, however, these programs have done little. 36 Finally, the "[l]ack of basic sanitation indirectly inhibits the learning abilities of millions of school-aged children who are infested with intestinal worms transmitted through inadequate sanitation facilities and poor hygiene." 37 It also adds to a higher rate of wasteful and unproductive time caused by adult illness and the need for parents to stay home to take care of children. 38 If the world's poor are to climb out of their morass, the status quo must change. One option for those who seek to aid those in need is privatization. Water and Sanitation is one of the primary drivers of public health. I often refer to it as 'Health 101,' which means that once we can secure access to clean water and to adequate sanitation facilities for all people, irrespective of the difference in their living conditions, a huge battle against all kinds of diseases will be won.
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34. MDG Goal 7, supra note 23.
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See, e.g., MICHAEL CLEMENS & TODD MOSS, WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS? 2 (2005), available at http://www.cgdev.org/ files/3940_file_WWMGD.pdf (indicating that the Millennium Development Goals have not been achieved because of the need for more financial aid, but also asserting that there are diminishing returns to financial aid).
37. WHO & UNICEF, supra note 17, at 2. 38.
UNICEF, Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene-Links to Health Education and Development, http://www.unicef.org/wash/index_healthandeducation.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) ("Poor water and sanitation exact a heavy economic cost in terms of health spending, loss of productivity and labour diversion.").
that water is a human right and that global corporations are exploiting the needs of the world's poor for profit." 39
Privatization of water systems in developing countries has been taking place for approximately a decade and a half. 40 The reaction to this phenomenon by the world's poor is, for the most part, uniformly unfavorable. 41 A number of examples from around the world provide insight into why this is the case.
A. Johannesburg, South Africa
In 1994, the World Bank required South Africa to privatize its water system as a condition to lending money to the new Mandela government. 42 Johannesburg turned over its water utilities to Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux (Suez), the French water conglomerate. 43 As soon as Suez received its concession, it began installing high tech water meters. 44 This privatization backfired on the people of South Africa. "Impoverished South Africans, unable to afford to feed the meters, turned back to their little rivers of cholera for water, and the government ha [ 
B. Cochabamba, Bolivia
The story of Cochabamba, Bolivia, is quite similar. In 2000, under World Bank pressure, the government of President Hugo Banzer granted a forty-year franchise to a private consortium, Aguas del Tunari (owned by San Francisco-based Bechtel), to manage the municipal water system. 48 Four months into the concession, water prices mushroomed by as much as 400%. 49 The entire set up not only forced workers to expend between 25% and 30% of their incomes to pay Bechtel for water but also left 40% of Cochabamba's residents unconnected to the municipal water system. 50 As dissatisfaction grew with Bechtel, anti-privatization protests and riots exploded across the country. 51 The police, sanctioned by the federal government, fought with the protesters, causing hundreds of injuries and the death of a teenager. 52 Following this extreme response, and with over $20 million in damage to private and public property, the government was forced to terminate the contract. 53 In response, Bechtel and its partners sued the Bolivian government for breach of contract, demanding $25 million in damages. 54 But in the face of worldwide public condemnation, the consortium abandoned the suit. 55 Additionally, Bolivia's privatization disaster gave birth to the Cochabamba Declaration, a nonbinding proclamation that states in pertinent part that "[w]ater is a fundamental human right and a public trust to be guarded by all levels of government, therefore, it should not be commodified, privatized or traded for commercial purposes." 56
48.
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C. Trade Liberalization and Water Scarcity
Vandana Shiva, the well-known Indian physicist and environmentalist, among many others, shares the sentiments of the Cochabamba Declaration. Additionally, Dr. Shiva and her colleagues and supporters assert that the World Bank's obligatory policies and the World Trade Organization's rules on trade liberalization "are creating a sweeping culture of corporate states all over the world." 57 She also charges the World Bank with playing a major role in the creation of water scarcity and with "transforming that scarcity into a market opportunity for water corporations." 58 In fact, the Bank currently has outstanding commitments for water projects in the billions of dollars. " The World Bank serves the interests of water companies both through its regular loan programs to governments, which often come with conditions that explicitly require the privatization of water provision, and through its private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation, which invests in privatization projects and makes loans to companies carrying them out. Lending about $20 billion to water supply projects over the last decade, the World Bank has been the principle financer of privatization. A year-long study by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, a project of the Washington-based Center for Public Integrity, released in February, 2003, found that the majority of World Bank loans for water in the last five years have required the conversion of public systems to private as a condition for the transaction. The performance of these companies in Europe and the developing world has been well documented: huge profits, higher prices for water, cut-offs to customers who cannot pay, little transparency in their dealings, reduced water quality, bribery, and corruption. The problems that India has experienced with World Bankfunded water projects are beyond the scope of this Article. However, two examples are necessary to provide a working understanding of the extent of the issue. The first is a Bank-funded project to provide water service to the city of Delhi. Newspaper accounts report that the project "seems drenched in a variety of questions. Lack of transparency in the functioning of a leading multilateral organization, favoritism for specific private sector firms, and inadequate homework done by the Delhi Jal Board (DJB) are only a few of the issues soaking the venture." 63 Following a presentation by Indian NGOs about the problems to the DJB's Chief Minister Sheila Dixit, she expressed concern about the project's adverse impacts, including a steep rise in tariffs, water inaccessibility to the poor, no guarantee of improvement in services or of constant water supply [and the fact that Delhi's citizens] would also have to bear the brunt of [increased] salaries of a total of about USD 25,000 per month which have been recommended for the employees of the concerned water distribution companies. 64
Additionally, Ms. Dixit told the NGOs that the project would be placed on hold, there would be more transparency, and the project would not progress without public participation. 65 Nevertheless, "a contrary reality emerged. This caused the controversy. The DJB seems to be simply implementing the 'orders' of the World Bank." 66 bank-funded water project in Pakistan [which] has led to widespread environmental harm and suffering among local communities. The project has contributed to deadly floods, and violates six of the Bank's binding policies. These are the main conclusions of an investigation by the Inspection Panel, the World Bank's independent investigative body. Id.
66.
Tamil Nadu
The second example is the Irrigated Agriculture Modernization and Water Bodies Restoration and Management (IAMWARM) Project 67 in Tamil Nadu, a state in southern India. It bears witness to India's enormous project expenditures and the concomitant disillusionment in the outcome of these projects. It also demonstrates how these water projects ultimately affect India's environment and communal life. Located in the state's capital district, Pudukottai, the project involves tank upgrading supported by a $556 million World Bank loan. 68 Although IAMWARM was filled with great promise, the reality is very different. The recently renovated tank bunds have developed serious cracks and have even crumbled. 69 In response, it was clear that there was a feeling of alienation from the project, and anger among the farmer community as it directly affected their livelihoods. "I am not able to sow this year as the work undertaken on the bund and sluice gate has diverted water away from my farm," said one farmer. 70
These two examples demonstrate the problems with corporate privatization of water projects and World Bank funding. They also point to one of the grave predicaments facing the world's poor in their pursuit of potable water and proper sanitation: the commodification of water. The Article next addresses that issue within the framework of the privatization of water resources.
D. Whisper Sweet Dollars in My Ear
The World Bank estimates the value of potential water markets at over $1 trillion. 74 It recently proclaimed that because of the guaranteed returns, its investment cost opportunities will be lower and it "will be well positioned via these businesses to profit even more significantly." 75 The following example from the Philippines demonstrates the potential harm of the World Bank's privatization program. In 1997, the Philippine government, with backing from the World Bank and private investors, privatized the municipal water supply of its capital, Manila, in an effort to promote efficiency and improve service. 76 The privatization of that city's municipal water system, despite its promise, reduced the public's access to quality water. After privatization, water became less affordable. Although water rates initially declined and services improved in the immediate aftermath of privatization, both concessionaries requested 15% tariff increases from the regulatory body within two years of the agreement. This was only the first of a series of rate increases, which eventually left rates 500-700% higher nine years after privatization. For most residents of the city, higher rates have resulted in a substantial portion of their income going to water and sewer service. 77
Critics assert that the history of corporate privatization of water utilities is dismal, and one can see why from Manila's experience. Additionally, once water and/or the system of distribution and delivery are privatized, the costs for local consumers become
73.
See 85 Indeed, privatization has an even more pernicious side. It affects not only "people's democratic right to water . . . [but also] . . . the livelihoods and employment rights of those who work in municipalities and local water and sanitation systems." 86 For example, when the World Bank forced Ghana to privatize the water system of its capital city, Accra, the system's 4,500 existing employees were fired, and the private company brought in its own people. 87
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See id. at 772-73 (discussing the extremely high cost of quality water As so often happens in the developing world, the employees 88 who were fired were members of Ghana's middle class and played a significant role in the local economy. Once any severance pay they may receive has been exhausted, many of the system's previous employees, now turned out and jobless, will likely descend into poverty and require government assistance to make ends meet. As a consequence of the World Bank's loans, the Ghanaian government was not only forced to pay private companies for managing Accra's water system and delivering that water at an inflated price, but it was also burdened with another obligation: supporting previously employed individuals. Moreover, the prospect of privatisation has [already] driven up consumer water costs in Ghana. Recent IMF and World Bank loan conditions mandated a 95 percent hike in water fees in May 2001 and additional price hikes are planned. Although the minimum wage has just been raised to 5,000 cedis a day, this amount can hardly sustain the average family. (One U.S. dollar exchanges for 7,000 cedis.) 89
The poor in the developing world cannot absorb such significant increases. It is why they rebel against mammoth rate escalations for When first privatized in 1998, PDAM Jakarta (PAM JAYA) (a public water utility owned by the city government) has [sic] approximately 3.000 employees. Shortly after the privatization, 2800 of them were seconded to the private concessionaires, Suez and Thameswater. Approximately 150 employees were still working for PDAM to supervise the service provided by the private sector.
In general, the payment difference between seconded and direct worker is 2.5 to 5 times. A manager (seconded employee) receives USD 1.200 while direct employees with the same level receive USD 2.700. At a staff level, a seconded employee (who has been working for 10 years) receive USD 160 while a new direct staff can receive USD 300).
Id.
89 water provisions. And it is also why corporate water companies are routinely ousted from developing states.
IV. EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES A. The Case for Community Privatization
Corporate efforts at privatization of water systems have thus far been a complete and utter failure. Nevertheless, many critics of water utility privatization in Manila and elsewhere concede that, for developing countries, private capital is required. 90 These investments are needed because municipal water systems in developing countries lack the funds to extend piping and connections. 91 A middle ground must be sought. For example, municipal water utilities might seek funding and operational expertise from investors who are interested more in long-term, stable opportunities and who do not expect returns greater than 5% to 6% per annum. This type of investor differs from the large corporate conglomerates that seek short-term, guaranteed high rates of return (i.e., 20% to 30% per annum) and, therefore, steeply raise rates. The Article next discusses this middle ground.
B. Surefootedness in a Middle Ground: Alternatives to Corporate Privatization 92
Nature abhors a vacuum. Within the vacuum caused by the failure of multinational corporations, a number of alternatives have developed. Two options that have succeeded in supplying potable water to the poor in Ghana and South Africa are addressed next. Both have elements of community cooperation and are based on small-scale or community-wide privatization approaches.
Savelugu's Partnership
The Ghanaian alternative involves the creation of a rural village's "public-community partnership." This entity was formed at about the same time that the decision to privatize water in Accra was made. As Accra's post-corporate privatization period ushered in the doubling of water prices, the small town of Savelugu in northern Ghana took a decidedly different route. The town's inhabitants formed a "public-community partnership," where the community collectively buys water from the Ghana Water Company, Ltd. and takes responsibility for payment collections and minor repairs. 93 The community also enacted rules to protect its most vulnerable members and set the price at which water is sold to its constituents. 94 This partnership has reduced to 15% the quantity of water that is unaccounted for through poor management, as compared with Ghana's average of 50%. 95 In addition, the community has a collection and payment record of 100%, as compared to 60% in other areas that the Ghana Water Company serves. 96
Cato Crest's Standpipes
Another successful community-based endeavor occurred in Cato Crest, an informal settlement on the outskirts of Durban, South Africa: 97
[I]nstalling pipes for traditional, in-home water supply would have cost too much, so a system of communal standpipes and private water tanks was introduced instead. At the standpipes, everyone has access to water and pays by the bucket, and there is also an option of installing private ground tanks instead. Each month, the tank owner pays for water in advance, and each day the tank is refilled. If the tank owner cannot pay a full month in advance, his tank is not refilled, but he always has access to the standpipes. 98
The Savelugu-Ghana Water Company Partnership and Cato Crest's Standpipe systems treat water as a commons-not as a corporate commodity. The commons approach to water "ownership" fits the idea that access to potable water should be a human right. Both examples also possess elements of this Article's proposal. 
V. A PROVEN MODEL FOR SUCCESS: THE NEW DEAL'S RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES
This Article's proposed model has its historical roots in President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal. During that era, rural communities lacked electricity because for-profit electric companies were convinced that running power lines to these potential customers was unprofitable. 99 By the 1930s, almost 90% of urban inhabitants had electricity. 100 However, only 10% of rural dwellers were as fortunate. 101 Why did such a lopsided system exist? For the same reason that the poor in today's developing world do not have water: there was a market failure in the provision of electric power. "Private utility companies, who supplied electric power to most of the nation's consumers, argued that it was too expensive to string electric power lines to isolated rural farmsteads" and that, in any case, most farmers "were too poor to afford electricity." 102 The lack of available electricity in rural areas meant that their economies were exclusively and utterly dependent on agriculture. 103 Consequently, manufacturing and other businesses unrelated to farming favored urban locations where electricity was available and easily acquired. 104 For many years, power companies continued to disregard the rural areas of the nation-except where conditions assured easy and early profit. 105 President Roosevelt, however, felt that electricity was a basic necessity that had to be provided to everyone. Hence, as part the New Deal, he established a new agency, the Rural Electrification 99.
George Sibley, Government Capitalism Can Be a Very Good Thing, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, May 22, 2009, available at http://www.hcn.org/wotr/governmentcapitalism-can-be-a-very-good-thing.
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See, e.g., id.
In 1939, residents of the towns of Gunnison and Crested Butte [Colorado] had already had electricity in heir homes for almost half a century. This was true for the nation at large, where virtually every city and town of any size had electricity. . . . But only one rancher or farmer in nine had electricity.
Id.
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Id. 104.
Id.
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Administration (REA). The REA's mandate was to fund independently formed electric cooperatives in rural America. 106
A. The Rural Electrification Administration: The Early Years
Realizing that the privately owned power sector would not connect farmers to electricity, the federal government took it upon itself to solve the lack of electricity in rural America. Given the depth of the problem and his keen eye towards practical solutions, President Roosevelt proclaimed that "[e]lectricity is a modern necessity . . . and ought to be found in every . . . part of the United States." 107 Therefore, one of the Roosevelt Administration's inaugural acts in its efforts to supply electric power to America's rural inhabitants was the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933 (TVAA). 108 The Act authorized the TVA Board to construct transmission lines to serve "farms and small villages that are not otherwise supplied with electricity at reasonable rates." 109
B. The Failure of the Market and Government Intervention
The Roosevelt Administration understood that if private utilities would not or could not supply electricity to the rural population, government would have to assume that duty. Hence, in 1933, President Roosevelt, with congressional assent, incorporated rural electrification into the Public Works Administration (PWA). 110 The
106.
See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Agric.
[USDA], Welcome to Rural Development's Electric Programs, http://www.usda.gov/rus/electric (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
Providing reliable, affordable electricity is essential to the economic well-being and quality of life for all of the nation's rural residents. The Electric Programs provide leadership and capital to upgrade, expand, maintain, and replace America's vast rural electric infrastructure. Under the authority of the Rural Electrification Act of 1936, the Electric Programs make direct loans and loan guarantees to electric utilities to serve customers in rural areas.
Id.
107. Sibley, supra note 99 (quoting Franklin Roosevelt). PWA was a part of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which was superseded in 1936 by the REA. 111 As the REA grew, one of its first acts was the initiation, in 1937, of a lending program. 112 In essence, the government recognized that private utility companies would not bring electricity to rural areas and thus passed the Act to bring electricity to those areas, such as the Tennessee Valley, and it launched the lending program to make funds available to rural residents who were not connected to the grid. In a 1935 article addressing the loan program entitled "Electrifying the Countryside," Morris Cooke, the head of the REA, observed that
[i]n addition to paying for the energy he used, the farmer was expected to advance to the power company most or all of the costs of construction. Since the utility company ideas as to what constituted sound rural lines have been rather fancy, such costs were prohibitive for most farmers. 113 REA's loans were thus aimed at remedying the financial onus required by private utilities before they would electrify rural areas.
"Even as late as July 1935, a group of utility company executives wrote a report in which they claimed that, in light of their earlier extensive research work, 'there are very few farms requiring electricity for major farm operations that are not now served.'" 114 That statement ultimately would come to haunt the for-profit electric industry when the REA and the rural electric cooperatives, of which there are more than 900 today, confirmed the falsity of the view that most farms requiring electricity were being served. 115 Rural electrification was rooted in the conviction that an affordable supply of electricity would improve the standard of living and the economic viability of the farm. Indeed, by 1939, the REA funded and helped 
C. The Stimulation of Supply and Demand
As the number of rural households with electricity increased, an interesting phenomenon took place: these farmers required more energy than city dwellers. 118 Moreover, when rural residents finally managed to get connected to the power grid, they also began purchasing refrigerators, stoves, and other electric appliances. 119 These sales helped spur local economies by increasing business for local merchants. 120 The demand for more electricity also served to defray some of the added costs of stringing power lines across the countryside. 121 Furthermore, to help support this thriving segment of the local economy, the TVA established the Electric Home and Farm Authority (EHFA). 122 The EHFA's mission was to extend low interest credit to farmers for the purpose of purchasing major electric appliances like electric ranges, refrigerators, and water heaters at reasonable prices. 123 Thus, the EHFA catalyzed an increase in the manufacture 116 .
Electricity for All, supra note 102.
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Id. Using the TVA's mandate for the distribution of inexpensive electric power and experimenting with new methods of state intervention in the economy, Lilienthal crated the Electric Home and Farm Authority (EHFA), a federal credit agency designed to subsidize and stimulate consumer purchases of and distribution of major appliances. 124 Indeed, the program was so successful that these appliances were sold at local electric cooperatives and local power companies. 125 Over the next few decades, the number of rural cooperatives doubled and the number of consumers tripled. 126 Consequently, the number of rural consumers who were connected to and served by the rural electric system grew at an exponential rate. One other key fact about Morris Cooke and the REA is critical to this history. The REA diverged from every other New Deal program "in that it did not involve much federal spending beyond the wages of its staff. Instead it was a loan program, a sort of 'government capitalism.' The REA extended low-interest loans and staff experts to cooperatives created by rural people who wanted electricity." 131 And even after the disappearance of the background framework, cooperatives all across the nation are still producing electricity. 132 In addition, since its inception some seventy-five years ago, the default rate on any of the funds that the federal government loaned to these cooperatives has been negligible (less than 1%). 133 electric appliances, primarily refrigerators, ranges, and hot water heaters. For the ambitious young director, the EHFA involved much more than selling a few iceboxes in the steamy Southeast. By increasing sales of refrigerators and other goods through the EHFA, Lilienthal sought to forge a political economy of mass consumption . . . .
The Electric
Id.
124 The history of the REA demonstrates that destitute individuals can be helped out of their dire situations where assistance is provided. This means, however, that financial and expert resources must be within their reach. That is the current dilemma facing those without water. There are no available sources of capital to build the needed water infrastructure for the estimated 1.1 billion people worldwide that lack clean drinking water. 134 Furthermore, given how they are currently organized, neither the UN nor the numerous NGOs have the capital to fund construction of entire systems in the thousands of villages across the world that require potable water. 135 Moreover, the LDCs and many other underdeveloped countries do not have the funds themselves, or else many of them would have already provided utility services to their residents. 136 Similarly, international organizations such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP) have not focused their financial resources on the problem of the poor's lack of access to water and would be required to redirect funds from their current programs in order to attempt even a small-scale test project. 137 Otherwise, it is fair to assume that they would have spent the money (no more than $200-$1,000) to drill a well and lay stand pipes. 138 Likewise, national aid programs, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), also appear to be uninterested in providing potable water to the forty-three nations it assists in Sub-Saharan Africa. 139
A. Raising the Capital to Drill Water Wells
Private sources of capital must be mobilized to provide loan programs similar to the REA's if potable water is to be provided to the world's poor. One vigorous and successful method of marshalling private-sourced capital that can be used to fund this type of project is attention to gender at all levels of water governance; and Cap-Net, an international network offering information-sharing and training to build effective water resource management capacity.
Id. (emphasis added)
. It is of note that the UNDP budgeted $90 million per annum for 90 countries-$1 million per country-a tragically paltry sum. However, even this meager amount was dedicated to studies of "integrated water resource management"; "building capacity for cooperative management"; "information sharing" but not a penny for providing water to the poor. African Heads of State and Government had shown a great political commitment to improving the water and sanitation sectors, notably at the 2009 Second African Water Week, held in Johannesburg, where Africa's water challenges were broadly recognized as central to the continent's development agenda. However, 340 million Africans still lacked access to safe water, and 580 million lacked access to basic sanitation. Seven of every ten rural people had no access to a toilet, while 884 million people worldwide used unimproved water sources. In 2006, more than 37 per cent of global population had no access to toilets, latrines or other improved forms of sanitation.
. While the press release mentions "great political commitment," it gives no indication of a financial commitment.
138. d) It is offered for creating self-employment for income-generating activities and housing for the poor, as opposed to consumption.
e)
It was initiated as a challenge to the conventional banking which rejected the poor by classifying them to be "not creditworthy". As a result it rejected the basic methodology of the conventional banking and created its own methodology. 143
Grameencredit's elements have allowed Yunus and GrameenBank to "provide[] over $2.5 billion in micro-loans" to 7.5 million Bangladeshis, with an average loan of approximately $150 and a repayment rate of 98%, which is on par with the repayment rate for REA loans. 144 The Grameen Bank Project (Grameen means "rural" or "village" in the Bangla language) was developed with numerous objectives, including the following:
-to offer a formal banking system to poor Bangladeshi men and women; -to eradicate local money lenders' manipulation of poor villagers; and -to create an opportunity for self-employment for Bangladesh's unemployed rural poor. 145
The bulk (97%) of the microloans have been extended to women or to women's enterprises. 146
B. The Inner-Workings of the Microcredit System
Grameen Bank's loan process is an uncomplicated, no collateral, trust-based financial agreement. 147 It involves no legal documentsprimarily because most of Grameen's borrowers are illiterate. 148 Consequently, the bank employs and relies upon "positive incentives of continued access to credit and other support to ensure repayments." 149 In fact, Grameen has yet to use either lawyers or the courts to force its borrowers to repay their loans. 150 When a likely borrower seeks a loan, she is required to establish a unit of five other borrowers from her neighborhood-or to join such a group of borrowers-and agree to meet with these other women on a weekly basis. 151 The theory behind this grouping is quite novel. First, each member of the group must repay her individual loan before any other group member can apply for a subsequent loan. 152 Second, the women must work together to ensure that each of their enterprises is successful enough so that each woman repays her individual loans while also pressuring each other to remain sufficiently profitable to repay their loans.
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Grameen Bank, A Short History of Grameen Bank, http://www.grameeninfo.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=19&Itemid=114 (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). The Bank's other objectives are to bring the disadvantaged, mostly the women from the poorest households, within the fold of an organizational format which they can understand and manage by themselves; and reverse the age-old vicious circle of "low income, low saving [and] low investment", into [sic] virtuous circle of low income, injection of credit, investment, more income, more savings, more investment, more income.
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146. Grameen Bank, Is Greenman Bank Different From Conventional Banks?, http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27& Itemid=176 (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
147. Yunus, supra note 144, at 22. 148.
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"Grameen's borrowers are also required to maintain a regular savings" account with the bank. 153 Indeed, both the bank's borrowers and their "nonborrowing neighbors as a group have $150 in savings for every $100 in loans outstanding." 154 Grameen's current funds are thus composed of its poor customers' savings. 155 And most importantly, the bank has been profitable for twenty-two years of its twenty-five year history, 156 demonstrating how successful the microcredit concept is. The next subpart addresses the issue of how to apply the microcredit system to the problem at hand.
C. Convergence
Grameen's success with very small amounts of money demonstrates that, for North Americans or Europeans, the amount of seed money is trivial. Loaning $100 to a villager under the conditions discussed above is almost no gamble at all. It amounts to twentyseven cents per day over the period of one year. Matches between donor and donee can be made over the internet or via a nonprofit. "The benefactors, in many cases, are ordinary individuals inspired by a movement that is reshaping philanthropy and making it as accessible as the click of a mouse or a visit to a house party." 157 For example, a recent newspaper article noted that "[a] Peruvian widow borrowed $64 and bought a few pigs. For $55, a villager in Ghana went into the mineral-water trade. A mother of nine in Guatemala upgraded her grocery store with $250." 158 Microcredit organizations such as NamasteDirect, 159 Kiva.org, 160 and Microcredit Summit Campaign 161 have raised millions of dollars from hundreds of thousands of individual lenders. 162 village and those embedded among disparate villages would drive the institutional structure for repayment and business development.
As each village begins to develop, it can then branch out to provide proper sanitation and educational opportunities for children, since children would not need to stay home to help with retrieving water and watering gardens. Additionally, village councils would be able to provide other amenities to villagers, just as rural farmers in the New Deal era were able to purchase appliances.
VII. CONCLUSION
If legal tools are to benefit the world's poor and disenfranchised, they cannot be void due to a perceived impossibility of implementation. This is the problem with the purported human right to water. It is quixotic. International lawyers thus must ferret out the means to provide those who have little or no access to potable water and proper sanitation with a suite of meaningful and workable legal options. If they do not, then paper tigers will continue to fill law reviews without ameliorating the problem.
The tools proposed here, including the use of microcredit loans and the implementation of a mechanism such as REA's loan program, will aid the 2.2 billion people in the world who lack potable water and proper sanitation. Both of these approaches have been tested across several decades, and they have proven capable of solving the problems facing the disenfranchised persons of the world.
